

The Russian Strategy in the Middle East

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Abstract: The Middle East seems fated to become the main danger zone of world politics. During the last decade the East-West détente has prevented a head-on collision between the superpowers there, but many signs point to impending changes. As the Soviet Union reaches strategic parity with the United States, there is growing temptation for it to assert its strength in an area so much nearer Moscow than Washington. The Western withdrawal from the area will be complete with the British departure from the Arabian Gulf. From the Soviet point of view the Middle East is a vacuum and seems the least risky area in the world in which to expand the Soviet sphere of influence. The Russian drive to the south which began in the eighteenth century seems at last likely to achieve fulfillment.

The Russians' strengthened position in the Middle East has come about not by coercion or infiltration but by invitation. The Soviet Union was officially asked to become a Middle Eastern power and was willingly offered the facilities it wanted by the governments of Egypt, Syria, Algeria and Yemen.

Russia's intervention in Syria is not the first time that the country has been involved in the Middle East. In fact, the country has a long history in the region. The Soviet Union was a major supplier of the Arab forces who fought against Israel in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, also known as the Yom Kippur War. The USSR later invaded Afghanistan in 1979, occupying the country for nearly 10 years. In 1990, it lost a key ally in the region when what was then South Yemen merged with the North. Growing U.S. influence in the region further hurt the Soviet Union's control of the region, particularly after the success of the Operation Desert Storm, a significant victory for the United States over Saddam. Shortly afterward, the Soviet Union collapsed and its influence in the Middle East largely receded.

The situation in Syria is becoming increasingly complex as the Islamic State seeks to expand its control in the midst of a civil war between Syrian rebels and the Assad regime. But Russia's intervention in Syria is the new strategic policy in the region, as it seeks to exert its influence outside of its borders. Recent developments have caused many to ask why Russia is intervening and what it hopes to gain. Thus we have shed some light about the Russia growing its influence and expand its new role and strategy in the Middle East.

Keywords: Russia's strategy, world politics, great powers, security.

1. INTRODUCTION

In fact, Russia and the West share certain common interests in the Middle East and the Muslim world in general. But a realization of this truth collides with the new Russian doctrine as it has developed in recent years, according to which Muslim countries are Russia's natural allies in the inevitable and perennial confrontation with the West. This ongoing debate, largely ignored in Western capitals, forms the subject of this paper.

When talking about the determinants and objectives of the strategic role of Russian foreign policy, it can be said that Russia, as the great powers, the balance between domestic and international determinants, and between internal and external considerations, but also seeking to employ foreign strategy in line with internal and interests. When talking about Russia's role in the Arab region, we cannot understand the determinants without regard to the date of this role, especially

in light of the Soviet era, as an entry point to read the strategic role of the current, or understand the extent of the possibility of re-activated.

Russia's strategic foreign policy goal is to prevent the consolidation of the United States' global dominance. This strategy became even more apparent in 2014 from the strong Russian response to the ouster of the pro-Russian government in Ukraine and the emergence of a pro-Western leadership in the former Soviet state.

Some Middle East countries has been associated with strategic relations with the Soviets, and is now in the process of deepening the relations with Russian, through follow-up charters and treaties concluded with the former Soviet Union, taking into account the disappearance of the ideological character which was from which system the Soviet collapsed. This is Russia's relations with countries in the region still maintains their causes, especially that Russia is still holding more than one sheet of the political game cards, through its special relationships and historical with Syria, Iraq, Egypt, Iran, Lebanon, Palestine, Yemen and Jordan, especially in the current period.

This view was expressed that since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian foreign policy has seen the process of restructuring under which became more realistic, measure the movements and trends of the size of its power, and to the extent achieved by those moves and trends of the benefit of Russian national interests.

This shows clear from the argument of Russian President Putin, when he emphasized that "the world is changing quickly, and the paths of globalization hide the dangers variety, with the economic crisis and tremors taking place in parts of the world encourage some of them to solve its problems at the expense of others using the means of military pressure. Thus, the emergence of subversive forces In some regions of the world threatens the security of people, and the countries that are trying to export democracy, do not hesitate to violate international law and the rule states that in order to remain an ally of these forces.

Russia was extremely worried about the close proximity of the newly pro-Western government and was concerned about the possibility of a NATO military presence in its back yard. This sparked a tit-for-tat chain of actions and reactions between Russia and the West, led by the United States.

In pursuit of the same objective, Russia began its intensive air campaign in Syria in September 2015. The Russian military operation in Syria elevated the US-Russia conflict into a geopolitical confrontation.

The Middle East is one of those crisis areas very of complex, dangerous economic, security, social and sectarian, ethnic and religious political strategy. In those sprawling area, there are many sensitive files that take international character, and its extensions and its ramifications. The deal with those files can not in any way that ignores the overlaps and conflicts with dimensions, being in contact with the issues related to the future of mankind in general, and the fate of many nations, and specially the balance of international powers.

On this, we can identify three major fundamental interests that determine the pattern of Russian behavior in the Middle East in general and the Arab world in particular, and in the following manner:

First, Work on the exhaustion of the United States strategically through the crowd out of the region, and through the lure Washington in riots in many areas – specially the East, - and this stems from the realization of the Russian leadership that when it comes time to restore the balance of world powers.

Despite Moscow knows fully that it cannot equivalent US economic or military force any time soon – it can then refuse to survive as a global power from the second category, and to insist on the need to reshape the global balance of power, and one of the means available to it are those persistent and debilitating troublemaking States United. For example, what came from the words of the Russian fleet commander Admiral Vladimir Masorin in August 2007 from the declaring of the study that states of getting back the Russian fleet of new shape to the Mediterranean supported military base Russian prefer to have Syria-based; in response to the United States announced its intention to build a new defense system air by 2015. This is what has been achieved already far from Russia's entry to the region of wider doors and set up military bases in Syria in particular.

In addition to this, Russia is seeking to exploit the fail in American cases in the Middle East, and especially Iraq, to increase its gains and influence in the region; and in support of its allies Iran and Syria on the one hand, and the strengthening of the Russian rapprochement with the countries of the region deduction from the expense of the United

States, of course, on the other hand, and a softening of the great strength of the US economic and commercial presence in the Caucasus region and Central Asia.

2. RUSSIA'S RELATIONS WITH THE MIDDLE EAST COUNTRIES

Perhaps Russia's opposition to the federal war on Iraq was proof of an obvious quest Moscow to thwart unilateral American project in the world in general, and in the Middle East in particular; where Moscow realized that the Iraqi quagmire will not be any way easier than the Afghan quagmire, which occurred when the Soviet Union in the Eighties the twentieth century, and it costs the Soviets materially and morally, and was among the factors their end, and the case repeats itself in the US strategy toward the nearby Syrian crisis, and the emergence of a strong non-official representative of the Islamic state alleged.

Therefore, Russia realized fully, that the US failure in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria or any other place Washington got involved in the Middle East will knock a new nail in the coffin of America Uniqueness unilateralism, and will succeed politically and globally vacuum in the new world order map, giving it the opportunity to return once again to the international arena and Middle Eastern, but this time strongly.

Secondly: Russia's economic interests are linked in the Middle East. Russia has been successful in the era of President Putin in reconciling economic objectives in the region, and strategic interests mentioned above. Here it should be noted that Russia's dealings with the nature of the different countries in the region now more than was the case in previous periods, which was based primarily on ideological element that was overcome in most cases on economic logic.

Thirdly: security dictated by geography, demography and rules; it can be said that Russia's new foreign policy based on a vision based on the importance of geographical and strategic value for the Middle East; as representing the pride of place in the hierarchy of global concerns, and that no global system can that is formed away from that strategic area; as it represents the heart of the world: where are decided the balances centers international forces, and the political platform representing the fulcrum and lever for any possible role for any US force, Russian or European.

Moscow believes that the potential political legacy and current directions positioned to reserve a prominent place in the formation of the new map of the world. However, Russia is working cautiously in this region full of political action, and tries not to lose any of the parties. For example, Moscow supports Tehran, with the first try not to bring it by antagonizing the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), also supports Damascus, in the fight against terrorism should not be taken into account with the strategy raises the concern of other Arab countries.

The Middle East represents a belt is tightly surrounded parties republics of Central Asia and the Caucasus, which Russia regards as its vital area, and harness all its potential to prevent any longer threatens those areas. So Moscow was interested since the collapse of the Soviet Union in particular, both Turkey and Iran; it because they are more two states in the Middle East desire for access to these areas, and try to have been compromised and control them; this is because of the kind of religious association, ethnic or linguistic which between these two countries and between Caucasian peoples in Central Asia, not to mention that closer ties with Iran benefit as much as the inconvenience of the United States, and reap the economic dividends not too bad of Iran.

Thus, the attempt convergence sought by Moscow with Tehran was considered one of the important means by which Russia used to curtail Tehran on the use of Islamic paper between the Muslims of Russia's estimated 20 million people, particularly in the Caucasus region where Moscow experiencing severe problems, in addition to Asia Central which it considers a vital area should remain limited.

Also it represented the issue of political Islam cross-border, and coupled with the most Western countries and the Middle idea of terrorism since the events of 9/11 of September 2001, one of the main reasons why Putin's Russia increase its interest in the Middle East, and work to broaden its base with the countries of that region, which prompted Moscow's growing interest in that region at the moment, especially after the Arab Spring events; fear of the arrival of the flame of those events to the biosphere of the Russia-whichever witnessed by what is known as the "color revolutions" – and in light of the Islamic boarding in power witnessed in most countries Arab Spring events.

It is worth mentioning that it is not then limited to open channels between the Russian intelligence agencies and their counterparts in the Arab Middle East countries, but Russia was able to expand its relations with countries in the region, including Israel, with whom since 2004 joint exercises to combat terrorism, not to mention the Dmitry Kozak Presidential

– representative Commissioner southern federal district, which includes the North Caucasus and the European southern Russia – immediately after his appointment in March 2004 several visits to Israel resulted in the signing a number of agreements on counter-terrorism, including the sale of Israeli drones to Russia to monitor the border around the Chechen Republic. Russia is seeking to exploit the cases of the US military failure in the Middle East, to increase its gains and influence in the region:

Fourth: The pillars of Russian foreign policy in the Middle East:

The constants of Russia in the Middle East did not prevent to bring about tremendous changes in this policy. In contrast, the supreme national interests of this state remained above considerations of pragmatism, and the changes were often collide with those interests and then stop; The commitments that Moscow inherited from the Soviet era sometimes restricted orientations; in order to preserve its reputation and international position.

Under geopolitical variables in the Middle East, it has been to Russia the foundations of legal and political strategy forced it in dealing with these various files in question on the international scene, both at the level of the so-called “war on terror”, or nuclear be racing, or conflict on oil and gas stocks and oil supplies, or Arab-Israeli conflict. All of this in an international atmosphere is not an adequate measure of stability, and the scene of racing did not specify the results, especially the subject of polar and unilateral US location of international leadership, as well as the international arms race; on the grounds that Russia’s role in all. This is not ignored; due to its important geopolitical situation, and it’s Eurasian growing, and its impact in a wide range of near and far fields.

(1) Legal and political foundations:

Russia has dealt realistically with Middle Eastern issues that have international dimensions interlocking, and in accordance with the political and economic interests. And it tried in recent years to maintain its international status without being the military alliances as its pillars. And hence Russian diplomacy has been active and trying to find peaceful solutions in accordance with the standards of public international law to the region’s conflicts, and without interference in the internal affairs of other countries, where the last Russian intervention in November strategy in 2015 back in the Syrian crisis with political overtones and the fight against terrorism while preserving Russian interests in the region.

And we will address some of the issues which the Russian pivot appeared on the rules of law, and the political positions taken by Moscow about those topics important international, regional and files.

(2) The issue of terrorism:

Russia tried to provide a definition of the concept of terrorism which is different from the Western and American definition of the concept. While Washington considered terrorist violence a political emitter on a non-warfare goals committed by state or national subsets clients, it has varied Russian vision with this definition; where it held Moscow acts of resistance, which was carried out by Palestinian and Lebanese against the Israeli occupation movements of acts of resistance to the occupation, and therefore It has shown great cooperation with those movements (such as Hamas and Hezbollah), while Washington considered those movements and terrorist organizations is prohibited to deal with it.

And the number of the evolution of the Chechen conflict in southern Russia, the last begun to change its point of view with regard to the so-called “Islamic terrorism”; observance of the West, and insurance of silence for its role in Chechnya, which is a reason for Moscow staleness by some Islamic and Arab countries, but Putin However, asked Russia’s entry into the Organization of the Islamic Conference as an observer, which was accepted in 2003.

Moscow continued its position is fixed from the concept of terrorism, and specifically of attempts to attach the charge to Islam. But the growth of extremism when several Islamic organizations, especially after the American aggression on Afghanistan and Iraq, and the continued Israeli aggression on Lebanon and the Palestinian people, and advocate for these organizations to re-Islamic caliphate until all the provinces inhabited by Muslims, which sparked resentment and fear of Moscow.

Although the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has announced that his country and the Arabs agree on the fight against terrorism and religious and political intolerance, Moscow did not recognize this situation in which the vital interests taken into account with the Arabs and Muslims from criticism of the Israeli side, who was accusing it of

supporting terrorism by providing Iran and Syria with weapons that up to Hamas and Hezbollah which are classified to the United States and Israel as terrorist organizations.

From the above it is clear that Moscow did not adopt the Western definitions of terrorism; sometimes disturbed by the lack of some acts of resistance or terrorism which put pressure on the Americans. But at the same time, Moscow were not neutral in many situations and other issues related to security and terrorism that threaten the national interests within Russia.

(3) The issue of American aggression on Iraq (March 20, 2003):

The differences and contradictions in the views and political attitudes between Moscow and Washington over the imposition of economic sanctions on Iraq lasting throughout the decade nineties of the last century; and for the information of Russia that the US State wants to impose its influence and strongly on the Middle East, particularly the oil-producing countries in it. Moscow thus sought to thwart US plans through the use of the right of veto in the Security Council at times, or to keep pace with those plans as to achieve Russian interests more or less at other times.

Despite Moscow's opposition to the US planned to invade Iraq, and the use of veto in this about the draft Security Council resolution, which launched in February 2003 and puts the Iraqi situation under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, MOSCOW has not taken any action against the US-led invasion after the fact; in order to be a partner in the settlement on the future of the US presence in Iraq through the launch of a fait accompli in the Security Council, with persistent and permanent set a date for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Iraq claim.

This is what justifies what some political analysts have seen as that the Russian leadership positions at the official level about the US invasion of Iraq crisis has differed from the Russian public attitudes that came out in demonstrations condemning this invasion, while the Russian official position was characterized by negative initially. However, after the passage of years on the western occupation of Iraq, Russian policy towards this issue features became more and more apparent.

Moscow Putin has teamed up with Berlin Gerhard Schroeder and Paris Jacques Chirac; to create an axis of refusal on the European continent against American hegemony, and that this coalition did not constitute concrete results on the ground, it may form a significant strain on the London Tony Blair and Washington, George W. Bush, and brought the message to the world that that what is happening on the ground in Iraq is not an "international" project, but it is a project of "US dominance".

It should be noted that this is the Russian position is allied with some of the European countries came after studied Russian trends towards dealing with the issue, which was the two approaches presidents: one was calling to engage in a war coalition against Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, led by the United States of America; and so out of profit and loss accounts, and under the pretext of maintaining the Russian economic interests in Iraq's post-Saddam Hussein era who felt Supporters of this approach made his departure sooner or later, and the other called for the self-distancing, and sufficiency not to block US plans, while retaining the ability to maneuver in a timely manner, either through the right to veto the Security Council, or the use of military means in accordance with the conditions that will emerge from the war in Iraq at the time. We see that the Iraqi events repeating itself in Syria, forcing Russia to take immediate action and direct intervention to save the Syrian regime's strategic ally of Russia, that the Russians pay for the establishment of military bases and moving some naval and air military pieces to the region.

Russia and then entered in the exchange of interests with Washington's policy. This became clear when docked deal of renovation Iraqi oil fields on Russian companies on 13 October 2009. This was interpreted as a concession to Moscow in Iraq; to take Washington At versus was so position of Russia in favor of, or at least non- oppositional to US in Afghanistan, Iran The rest of the countries.

However, the United States and Israel were not unhappy about the behavior and the role of Russian in the Middle East, although parking Russia against intolerance and Islamic extremism in the Caucasus, despite Moscow's support the legitimate Lebanese forces against Islamic extremists in the Barid river in Lebanon, (Nahr al-Bared) camp in northern Lebanon, the summer of 2008.

This US position on the role of Russia and its policy in the Middle East since the beginning of the third millennium is what made the Russian President Putin clearly announced at a summit of Islamic countries in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia in 2002 for his country's refusal of the US characterization of the concept of terrorism.

After the disintegration of the state of the Soviet Union in the late 1990's and inherit by the Russian Federation, the foreign policy of this country moved from the trend towards being misled by US foreign policy, during the reign of Yeltsin to go about building the internal efficiency Russian federal state after the economic collapse and social disintegration that have known during the nineties, in order to support the external effectiveness and employ them to build a state and influential situation.

The Vladimir Putin, national and pragmatic, maker this trend, since his first term in 2000 and reflect the Russian national security strategy extended to the year 2020, which was officially adopted in 2009, Which intended to secure the accelerated economic growth and transform the Russian Federation economically into a major international force and employment the output of this transformation to secure the interests of Russia's national security and to expand the circle of this strategy at the regional and international. Here we see that the Russian strategy began to clear of military action in the Middle East and building huge military bases, where indicators suggest that Russia for the first time in the political history of the movement and the adoption of a long-range missile bases in the Middle East.

And the Arab world is among those regional departments that received particular attention by the Russian President resulted in military, economic and technical task agreements. It could be argued that the Arab-Russian relations are moving gradually towards the establishment of relations of cooperation between the two sides. This development has contributed to the realization of the benefits of Moscow reactivate the historical relations with some Arab and develops with other Arab countries.

These relations date go back to the Cold War era, which was the station where the Arabs and the Soviets realized the nature of the negative impact of the US variable on their projects, which produced mutual need for a close relationship and did not solve the ideological contrast between them without it.

The Arab world, part of some countries at that time realized that American foreign policy constitute the most serious challenge about it, so it did not find escape from the use of the Soviet Union, which was in the period leading policy of defiance of US strategy in the world. On the other hand it was found that the Soviet decision-makers in the Arab need for such an opportunity to penetrate the US containment policy toward their country on the one hand, and to support the strategic goals of the Soviet cosmic on the other hand.

But these relations were not fixed at a certain level and ranged between excellence at times and sometimes conflict and retreat. The reason for this situation is lack of awareness of the Soviets that their support for the Arabs does not mean siding to their policies. In contrast, the Arabs did not realize that the Soviet Union as a superpower deliberately to give the highest priority to private national interests, most notably the strengthening of the positive relationship with Washington.

Lack of awareness of the Arabs and the Soviets of the determinants of these relations has led, said Mohammed Hassan in Heikal, to be the Soviet Union's mistakes in dealing with the Arabs, as it was for the Arabs Wrongs in their dealings with the Soviets. Therefore, and due to poor common perception of these determinants, gradually the Arab-Soviet relations that were promising for decades fell down.

Observers of the reality of these relations today is well aware they are open, given the regional developments, several scenarios in the future. First, they may gradually rise to the ranks of special or strategic relations, but not on the conditions that usually paid to such relationships, most notably the common external challenge and the subsequent adoption of a uniform policy about it, and about the key issues for both parties. We do not see in the present Russian-Arab relations that supports such a perception, it is naive to believe that the United States constitute a barrier to this challenge.

As was the compass formerly Soviet, Russian Compass continues today in the direction of the US state, which confirms that the Russian national security strategy has made the relationship with the United States triangle basic pillar.

The same applies to the bulk of Arab foreign policies, known permanent adhering to build a close relationship with the United States of America. Therefore, the view that Russia will be the alternative to Arab relations with the United States does not understand the depth of these relations, which will not cancel the possibility of transmission center of the world to Asia.

Also it cannot be considered that Iran is a common challenge outside this, while the bulk of the Arab Gulf States believes that Iran poses a threat to national security, Moscow is keen to develop its relations with Iran due to input geo-strategic, economic and security task.

At the level of the second scenario, the Arab-Russian relations lack the broad public support because of the limited opening up to the Arab components of Russian public opinion. Vice versa. Let us remember that the external efficiency of the state not only reflected in the efficiency of its diplomacy, but in the popular actor to employ diplomacy as well. So it may carry limited supporting the Arab public opinion and Russian mutual relations to be paid to remain normal at least.

We may not as well as the Arab-Russian relations to be in isolation from the impact of that political, security, economic, regional and international continuous variables. This is due to the relations between the countries that are moving within the global and regional environment, complex and changing allow a group of supporting actors opportunities for movement, and another set of brakes that limit the effectiveness of this.

In contrast to those Arab views vary in its vision for the future of Russian-Arab relations between pessimism and optimism, we see that the future of these relations may be combined with compound scene that makes a balanced adjustment, which combines promote a society based on the foundation and retreat properties. This as well as continuing in this manner and the time is coming until it clicks and given the variables list either prosperous or decline.

In order to restore Russia's role in the region and promoted internationally and regionally, Russia moved toward the Middle East to coincide with the decline in influence of the United States; because of the decline in its hesitant in dealing with some of the crucial issues for the countries in the region. This does not mean Moscow's hegemony over the region, but only the growing role and maintain its interests.

The evolution of Russian foreign policy has gone through in two phases: the first marked by the attention the countries of the geographical proximity, by strengthening the ties of friendship and cooperation with them through the Customs Union and the Organization of the Collective Security, and then victory in the South Caucasus war against Georgia in 2008. The second was characterized by direction to the influence on a wider regional scale, through interest in China and the Middle East, Turkey, and joint cooperation and seek to play a role in the pivotal issues in those countries to balance their western role.

It could be argued that the role of Russia in the Middle East and North Africa has increased with the start of «Arab Spring», which opened up new avenues for the promotion and development of its influence. This is reflected in its presence over the Syrian crisis. Russia stands since the beginning of the crisis in the side of the Syrian regime, which represents a strategic ally in the region, in the face of armed opposition of «Free Syrian Army», which presented it with the United States and its allies military support, and political support was the condemnation of the Syrian regime's actions and calling on the various platforms international and global take deterrent steps against it. But Russia has succeeded in sparing Syria American military strike, which is a great success for its diplomacy in the Syrian crisis, and here is today the situation under control of its military presence intensified.

3. THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOVIET MILITARY STRATEGY

The Middle East, the Arabian Gulf and the eastern Mediterranean are of particular strategic concern to Moscow because of their proximity to the Soviet Union. In addition, the Soviets view the Middle East in the second half of the 20th century as akin to the Balkans at the turn of the century: they consider the area to be the most likely source of a world war. Since 1979, moreover, the Soviets have confronted the concrete possibility of a major military conflict with the United States in the area north of the Persian Gulf. This prospect has brought the dangers of political turbulence in the Middle East into sharper focus, and altered Soviet perceptions of the immediate strategic significance of various countries in the Middle East.

With the growing Russian role in the Middle East, which was clearly evident in Russia's sale of missile defense system (S-300) to Iran and the growing presence of its diplomats? Some considered that it poses a risk to the stability of the military balance in the region. The United States and its allies failed to drive change them as means. US Evade fears of its commitments to the region and engagement with Iran has led negotiations on its nuclear program, and its failure to deal with «Al Assad» system and the organization «Daash» - many of its allies to look to diversify the security of their agreements, including the trend towards Russia.

Here we would like to clarify Russia's foreign policy toward the Middle East, including the goals and opportunities and determinants of Russia's role compared to the US role, through three axes: the first deals with trends of Russian foreign policy in general, and that is reflected in the basic texts of the document «the concept of foreign policy of the Russian Federation» which published in the years 2000 – 2008, 2013 and 2015. This document, signed by the Russian President gives a good idea of the Russians look and perceptions of the world. The second discusses the multiple uni polar in the Middle East against the polar (and the international community in general), in the framework of Russia sought to break the grip of the United States unilateral to it. The third axis is related to the economics of Russian policy in the region, which depends on the diplomatic arms sales, and how to use the region to Russian supplies as leverage against the United States.

First, the concept of Russia's foreign policy:

The site Russia, which it invaded in the international arena, and read to the changes occurring in the global political scene, starting from the global financial crisis, passing down the role of the United Nations and the monopoly of its organs, particularly the Security Council, leading to turmoil in all of East-East Russia paid about reformulating determinants and its foreign policy priorities in what is known as «principles of Russian foreign policy for the period from 2013 to 2020». Those principles that have kept a set of constants and changed the range of orientations, compared to what it was since the beginning of the millennium.

On February 12, 2013, Russian President «Vladimir Putin» signed (after eight months of resuming his role as president) a document «the concept of foreign policy of the Russian Federation» to determine the features of Russia's foreign policy and strategic objectives. And then the signing of the security agreement with the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in a visit to the Kremlin in November 2015, and in order to understand the Russian approach towards the Middle East, this document should study and understand its meaning and purpose. Where the document comes to make Russian foreign policy in line with the major developments, such as the global financial and economic crisis, and change the balance of power in the world, the growing turmoil in the Middle East and North Africa, and the growing importance of cultural and civilization dimensions of global competition.

The document identifies nine key objectives Russia is pursuing in order to ensure «protection of the individual and the society and the state», and is in the most important:

- Secure high standing in the international community as one of the electrodes influential and able to compete in the modern world.
- create favorable external conditions for the growth of the Russian economy steadily and dynamically promote economic status.
- Effective promotion of international peace and global security and stability.
- strengthen relations with neighboring countries, and to help overcome the existing tensions and conflicts, and the development of bilateral partnership and multilateral relations.
- Promotion of the Russian language to enhance the country's position in the world.
- Work on the development of a constructive dialogue and partnership relations between civilizations; to promote reconciliation between different cultures and communities and to ensure the rich exchange between them.

It should be noted that the 2013 document of great importance, especially compared with the end of the year 2000 (signed after a month of taking «Putin» office the first time, in addition to a close in 2105). Last focused on the unilateral nature of the international community at the time, and then headed towards Russia «to pursue a multi-polar system of international relations reflects the diversity of the modern world and the diversity of his interests significantly». In this sense, we can consider that Russia's approach to the Middle East based on destabilizing the hegemony of the United States unilateralism in the region, and therefore we can understand the motives of Moscow's support to countries Washington considers more disturbing than others. After thirteen years, the latest document showed a different view towards the world, where the current geopolitical scene consider that «polycentric system, accompanied by an increase in economic and political turmoil at the global and regional levels». Therefore, it seems that the objectives of the document in 2000 to be achieved in view of the Russians against the backdrop of the decline of American unilateralism in the Middle East, the outbreak of revolutions «Arab Spring», and the emergence of the current in Syria and Iraq conflicts, and

the rise of the Islamic Republic. In this context, document 2013 does not clearly states – as indicated in its predecessor – to the unilateral US threat, despite its warning that «Russia is looking to guide the actions of the United States in the international arena of international legal standards accurately, particularly the Charter of the United Nations, including the principle of non- interference in the internal affairs of other countries about the priorities of Russian foreign policy, the interest focused mainly on the geographical surroundings in what is known as independent countries society «CIS», and to strive towards forming a federation of Association all countries, and integrates the Customs Union and the Treaty on Collective Security within the framework of capable international organization On the face of global challenges and threats. Then, the role of Eastern European States, the European Union and then «NATO», then the United States, which came in the last position in the list of priorities. Regional and international alliances Moscow also occupies within the framework of organizations such as the «Shanghai» and «APEC», (G8) and (G20) a prominent place in the run-up to prioritize its relations with the East Asia and the Middle East, and South America that come in another list.

With regard to the Middle East, Russia says it is seeking to contribute effectively to the stabilization of the situation by, and work to promote peace and harmony among the peoples of each country as well as the North African countries, on the basis of respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in internal affairs, which contrasts with US policy in the region which is based on interference in the internal affairs of states.

It should be noted here that the need to establish the probability of the emergence of problems, with an attempt to analyze and understand the foreign policy objectives of any country through official documents alone. Since these documents are usually formulated with an eye to the highest principles, and be more perfect than the actual actions on the ground.

Second, Russia's policy towards the Middle East compared to the policy of the United States of America:

Russia through its policies in the Middle East seeking to try to achieve a balance of power, and the formation of relationships and alliances with isolated judgment about the international political and economic system which is backed by the United States systems. It turned out that in its continued support for so-called «revolutionary camp», which includes Iran, Syria, and adopted at the use of the Security Council to activate the policies, and that is what happened when prevented military intervention in Syria that would threaten «Al Assad» stay in power., And even up to this day, Russia did not give up its positions in the Syria , where officials said the Russians on the Syrian regime is to face terrorism and tools downloaded from fueling the situation

In this context, «the Middle East Policy Council» 2012 research published a paper prepared by «John Turner», who confirmed that the Russian policy toward the Middle East is the policy of «economic rather than a political», and based on the interest away from ideological considerations, contrary to US policy America and the United. «Turner» wrote that Russian foreign policy can be defined as «follow-up to Russian interests in the framework of international law and the market economy, international cooperation against terrorism and energy policies.

We believe that Russia has a focus on non-military means to secure a change in the region, in light of concern at the continued US military intervention there, which appeared when Russia confirmed its desire to a non-military solution to the Iranian nuclear crisis, even with the approval of the imposition of sanctions on Iran over its nuclear program. This means the possibility of and selected Iran as an ally.

And then we can say that Russia has dealt realistically with the Middle East issues, especially with an international dimension, according to political and economic interests. Also it tried to maintain its international status without having to be the pillar of the military alliances since the last two decades. Then Russian diplomacy has been active and is trying to find peaceful solutions in accordance with the standards of international law, and without interference in the internal affairs of states. It can be said that the region is one of the main arenas of competition for influence between the US and Russian forces. Syria is an arena for conflict and political and military engagement, as well as Iraq. As for Egypt, it is a political and diplomatic arena to compete, as well as Yemen. In addition to Iran, which the parties seek to gain approached; America is seeking to sign a nuclear deal with it can open up on them, Russia is trying to strengthen its relations with it through the export of weapons and its support in a number of important issues.

Third: The role of arms sales to the Middle East in Russia's foreign policy:

Whatever form the arms exports with respect to the policy of the Russian economy at the center, and President «Vladimir Putin» since the beginning of his first term in 2000, announced that arms exports are the main source of income for the

Russian arms industry. In this context, Russia continuously worked to be part of the equation armament in the Middle East, even become the most important region for Russia with respect thereto.

It could be argued that area has seen a great development during the recent period, where several Arab countries went to the signing of military agreements to buy Russian weapons and the establishment of nuclear reactors for peaceful purposes. And not only that, but Russia turned to selling weapons to countries in the Persian Gulf, such as Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates.

In the same context, the BBC magazine published an analysis done by security correspondent «Frank Gardner» in 2013, dealt with the transformation of the Gulf States policy toward Russia, adding that those countries had refused to Russian arms, but after years of rapprochement with the West in order to defense contracts, enthuse «Spenders Arabs», such as Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, to diversify arm them to go about Russian arms.

In a similar article published in April 2015 by the BBC reporter diplomatic «Jonathan Marcus», he spoke about Russia's decision to proceed with the sale of air missile system (S-300) to Iran, which has raised concerns among some of the return of the Russian role. The article reported that it probably «sets new effort by Moscow to strengthen and placed diplomat in the Middle East.» Speaking «Dmitry Trenin», the «Carnegie Center» in Moscow, from the logic of Russia in arms sales and its policy in the region, saying: « by having broken its relations with the West, Russia is seeking to strengthen its ties with non-Western players.”

It could be argued that the arms sales lead roles in key Russian thinking: the first and most obvious is that it is a major source of government income, and thus Russia remains the second largest exporter of weapons in the world. The second is the quest to meet the United States unilateral authority in the region. «The Economist» magazine has written on the subject of increased Russian arms sales in the region, pointing out that such sales be sent «multiple messages» in order to «stress that Russia has a strategic role due to play in the Middle East when to get rid of America; where it is It could be a spoiler for the Kremlin's strategy of America, even in light of the occurrence of Russia under economic pressure from the West as a result of its policy in Ukraine. It also intends to claim a share of the economic rewards in Iran once the sanctions are lifted.

It is best not to look at the adoption of this strategy to control more authority regarding the future of the Middle East. This is evident in the weakness of the ability of Russia to the actual impact in the pivotal issues in the region failed when – for example – in its attempt to reach a peace agreement in Syria. Moscow still lacks of power or necessary to excel on the United States diplomacy, as capable of shaping the Middle East and the owner of the real diplomatic power which wants to do that or able to do that.

On the other hand, like the development of Russia, it seems that the Middle East used its relationship with Russia to put pressure on the United States, according to published reports in the United States under headings such as «Russia pushing the United States to get out of the Middle East», the Russians filled the space left by «Obama» administration after military supplies and materials to Egypt cut off in response to the overthrow of the Muslim Brotherhood-backed president. These theories have helped in reaching a political speech in the United States say that «Obama» management is weak and has lost its influence on the historical rival which could affect the political opposition to exert pressure on the government to take a more aggressive policy toward the Middle East include the exchange of weapons even more in public.

In summary, it is clear that Russia is seeking to consolidate its relations with Middle Eastern countries and extending its influence in the region to achieve a set of objectives, the most important of which are the following:

- Expanding areas of its influence and to encounter the unipolarity led by the United States, and work to create a new balance of power to serve its interests.
- Cooperation and coordination in the field of energy, because Russia looks at the Gulf States as an ally in the global energy market and not a competitor. And the coordination and cooperation between Russia and the Arab countries in the field of energy in the context of maintaining oil market stability and to ensure a minimum level of oil prices.
- Strengthening economic interests, especially with regard to arms exports to countries of the region, and providing assistance in the development of peaceful nuclear programs.

In spite of the growing Russian influence in the region, this does not mean that Russia presents itself as an alternative to the United States, all the issues are coordination between them, and that Russia does not want to enter into a direct

confrontation with the US side, where Russia's strategy based on interests and real relationship with the United States of America, and then they are more likely to encounter the differences that arise from time to time with Washington and settled on a way that ensures the protection of Russia's interests and national security. It is also clear that Russia lacks the internal economic resources enjoyed by the United States, which assisted in the financing of the new foreign policy in the Middle East. The best description of Russia's policy towards the region, can be described that it as « scrounger »; which it takes advantage of the current political confusion to undermine American unilateralism in the region. With an emphasis on it should not be read so to restrict the USA part, or the overthrow of the United States, but an attempt to diversify its powers with influence in the region.

4. THE MIDDLE EAST BETWEEN THE CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

The Middle East witnesses many armed conflicts and disputes, where it got more complicated by the challenges of the Syrian crisis, in addition to other things, including the emergence of the Islamic state and the armed parties like Hezbollah in Lebanon, unemployment among young people in the whole region caused the destabilization of strategic stability from various aspects. These things opened up a vast field in front of a pivotal question and answering it remained and limited now, that; when will the region witness a little a breakthrough? Despite the fact that some international and foreign institutions reports and US intelligence services, indicating that the region's future landmarks will emerge in the coming years, by 2020, only to approach the issue from the perspective of psychology and political meeting indicates its part that such situation characterized by chaos will be exacerbated, and it is not able to determine a course of the Middle East, it is that its people are tired of bloodshed.

This is based on our analysis of trends about the events in the Arab world into three global reports issued by the specialized agencies rely on specialized scientific journals, international, local sources and reports, include:

These reports agree that the “worst has already happened,” and that the Middle East in general, and the Arab world in particular, has become the most violent region politically, the most dangerous and least peaceful and stable at the level of the world. Also agree that the region will continue, for the time invisible, grab arranged in regions of the world less peaceful after waves of escalating violence and infighting. These reports concludes that compared to the situation of countries in the Middle East and the rest of the conditions in the world, indicate that the region has become more dangerous and less peaceful, less stable regions , occupied with frightening, such as sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia in particular rank.

This Global Peace Index, published by the Institute for Economics and world peace in Australia identified the countries “least peaceful” in the region, namely Syria, Iraq, Sudan, Iran, Libya, Yemen, Egypt, Lebanon and Israel ... as the most dangerous regions in the world, so based on a ten private security indexes The safety of the community, including: crime and terrorist activity, violent demonstrations and relations with neighboring countries and the stability of the political situation and military spending of GDP rates, and other indicators concerning the deaths resulting from homicide and armed conflicts and disputes within the state.

The Global Peace Index report attributes the reasons for the decline peace rates to the wave of globalization, which alerted the minority to the need for access which deprived it of the gains we have not enjoyed in the Middle East, and the role of mass communication and the Internet that have strengthened the demands of large segments of the citizens which were met by ignoring Arab governments and what the repercussions after the “Arab Spring” that disappointed the people and backfired.

According to Charli Rhythms, an analyst of political risk in “Maplecroft” Foundation about escalating social violence and political conflict in the countries of the “Arab revolutions” that still cast a shadow over the region, having turned the Middle East into more areas of the seriousness of the world in 2013 and the first quarter of 2014; Syria occupies ranked 69 globally on the political risk index in 2010, then it became to occupy the first place in 2014, this order doesn't not only reflect the size and intensity of the conflict, which has killed more than 550 thousand victims until the month of December 2015, but also reflects the disintegration that happened to the components of the Syrian society.

Iraq came after Syria; According to the report, Iraq experienced 3278 terrorist incidents led to the death of 6034 people and injured 15023 since the beginning of 2008 until April 2014.

The report notes that Syria extracted from Afghanistan the title of less of the world a peaceful to come in the center of 162 in the world and the center 19 (the last world state) at the level of the region, as Iraq comes in 159 place globally and 18th place (second most dangerous country) at the regional level. Because the report was prepared before the fall of Mosul, however Daash on the tenth of June 2014, it did not address the heinous crimes committed by the terrorist organization in the cities of (Spyker, Sinjar, Al Ramady).

Here I would like to ask some questions and analyzes on the future of the Middle East in light of these difficult situations plaguing the region. This was the question remains the basic since the outbreak of the Arab revolutions four years ago and half year, and still hesitate with the developments intertwined represented in the decline of democracy and revolutionary forces in most Arab countries with the rehabilitation of military tools and especially with the rise of terrorism, violence, political polarization, the decline leaders charismatic and support institutional structures, as well as arrangements democracy. In the Middle East «no body won », if we have to answer two basic questions, is the Arab revolution the reason for this chaos and this collapses? The second one is about trying to develop scenarios for the future of the volatile region in nature.

The answer to the first question is definitely negative, the world history of revolutions knows that the developments take successive waves rise and fall, and that the resistance to the old patterns, whether political, regulatory or cultural revolutionary forces that are looking for a change and create a new format in the year of revolutions. In other words, what is happening now enjoys historical determinism, regimes that refused to change and reform and accepted the formula of corruption and policies of the status quo had to be its day of the fall, though this was not the day in 2011 was inevitably later. If no use of the joke or call the good old days, it is best if you look to the future and preparing for it. But the next question which future?

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has begun to feel another danger, which is the reduction of the role of the United States in the Middle East, especially since the period after the military invasion of Iraq in 2003? Note that this is due to political developments within the United States itself as well as the emergence of an emerging regional powers are looking for its role in the region. Analysts have also talked about the signs of «fatigue» began to reflect on the United States' ability to deal with conflicts that are shaking the Middle East, which explains why the US administration's reluctance to embrace a military approach to deal with the Syrian crisis. USA has announced that it will turn its attention to the Asian continent to address the aspirations of the growing strength of the Chinese center.

The reality of regional and international – especially the challenges and large bets created by the Arab Spring – is what drove the political and economic leaders in the Middle East countries to proceed in the development of new policies that will increase the strengthening of the bonds of close cooperation among themselves in order to meet the challenges and threats increased by more force. In this particular regard descend call by the rulers of the Middle East to move from the stage of cooperation to a new advanced stage which was the most important regional associations to cope with this sudden change. It must be noted that there are social and economic multiple political issues pose challenges facing all countries in the region, without exception, in many areas such as the diversification of sources of income and development base of non-oil economy and growing unemployment rates among young people , the participation of women in public life , the efforts of economic and political development and investment flows to and from countries in the region, and the prospects for educational reform of e-learning.

There are also several other sensitive issues of concern to countries in the region, especially the Arab Gulf, such as sustainable oil security and the development of renewable energy and food security sources, corporate governance and devote transparency and create an attractive environment for private sector development, in addition to the corporate governance policy in sovereign funds Gulf management that ensures the investment of the Gulf capital surplus. The economic, political and security challenges facing the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), including the issue of the single currency and still hit a lot of obstacles, in addition to the debt and the issuance of instruments and enforcement of intellectual property rights, risk assessment and programs for sustainable fiscal stimulus in the long run. There was a consultative summit of the leaders of the Gulf Cooperation Council in the midst of the events that were taking place in many Arab countries have been at the time Gulf leaders to discuss the issue of expansion of the Council to include both the Kingdom of Jordan. And the kingdom of Morocco controversy at the time in the Arab world and the rest of the world about the reason why the six countries Members of the Gulf Cooperation Council and the rich vast oil wealth at the time seeking to join other two Arab states lacked natural resources and labor are big , above all, what are the strategic benefit

for the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Interpretations and explanations of political and geo-strategic have multiplied in an attempt to find out the dimensions of that decision to be taken by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).

The «Arab revolutions» and what resulted from consecutive repercussions came to highlight the need to promote political and economic stability and document security in the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, especially in the presence of «Shiite crescent» stretching from Iran to Lebanon and the Gaza Strip, through Iraq and Syria an extension to Yemen.

There is unspoken ideological tendency in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) that wants to create an expanded Sunni Front and the province of the Kingdom of Morocco and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, in the face of challenges and threats of regional and international and maintain the achievements and gains and build on them in order to move development efforts forward. Analysts said that the issue of the expansion of the Gulf Cooperation Council to include the two kingdoms, the Council would gain a strategic and important demographic deeper stretches from the Atlantic Ocean to the Persian Gulf? Allowing the stopping and extension of «Shiite crescent.»

Also, there is no doubt that the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council need to deepen the demographic depth Sunni Strategic which explains its openness to both countries as well as the adoption of a strategy grew clearer over the past months, which is that based on the strengthening of political and economic relations and even security coordination with Turkey an important player in the Middle East. If Bashar al-Assad's regime fell and replaced by a new system reflects the Sunni majority in Syria, this may in the interest of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and contribute to the disturbance of what became known Shiite Crescent that stretches from Iran to the Gaza Strip? Passing through all of Iraq, Syria and Lebanon? A «Shiite crescent» shows how big strategic interest earned by the Islamic Republic and the American military invasion and destruction of Iraq.

In exchange for the strategic and demographic depth of the Kingdom of Morocco and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, of course, will benefit from the investment and economic aspects in terms of access? For example? Differential oil prices and the development of commercial exchanges and easy access to Gulf markets as well as attract more Gulf investments in light of the volatile situation experienced by the «Arab Spring countries», which was and still is an area of Arab investments. «Arab revolutions» have caused undermining the geographical balance-regional strategy clearly and tangibly. There is no doubt that the strengthening of the bonds of cooperation and consultation between the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the Kingdom of Morocco and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and to promote convergence at all levels with Turkey? Strongly emerging regional power? And falling «imminent» to the regime of Bashar al-Assad ally of Iran in the interest of all countries in the region, which has economic strength make it play an important role as a major player in the financial and economic regional and global stability.

In fact, the moves by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) reflect the extent of recognizing regional challenges posed by the ongoing in many countries of the Middle East reflect the shifts as far as recognizing a clear need to work to prepare for the future and its challenges. King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al Saud has called for the GCC transition from one stage to the advanced stage of cooperation devoted unity in what is called: Gulf Union as a necessity, economic and security strategy are dictated by the situation and the regional and international changes.

The Gulf Union project remains the strategic and economic importance – still collide with some of the challenges resulting mainly from the reservations of some member States that show a large order to maintain their financial sovereignty and internal and external policies, which is in its consideration of an integral part of its national sovereignty.

The project of gulf monetary is the most important projects launched by the Gulf Cooperation Council over its long career that stretches over the past years, the project is considered.

In light of the case of large changes and uncertainty in the Arab world and the Middle East witnessed it returned the question of political integration between the Member States to present themselves through the Gulf federation project. What are the reasons why Member States are considering the establishment of the Gulf Confederacy?.

It is clear that members of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries are well aware of the challenges and threats to security, stability and economic and social development and gains as much as recognizing that the Arab world and the Middle East in general has entered the phase of uncertainty that may involve challenges of significant and serious and the stakes.

The advocates of the unit – who support the call launched by Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al Saud to move from the stage of cooperation to integration phase? Gulf Union that the project has become a political necessity and urgent strategy that will members of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries gain significant weight in the international arena and strengthen its ability to defend its security and protect its vital interests and primarily oil wealth.

Matteo Ogernsa wrote an important book entitled «GCC and international relations» . he wrote, in particular: «Gulf Cooperation Council consisting of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates is one of the most powerful regional organizations and sub-regional in the world and most successful in the Arab world .. Gulf Cooperation Council has the form of the important framework important forum, which takes industry internal security strategies in the Gulf region, which is one of the areas most successful and vitality in the world. Also do not forget the great weight that enjoyed by the Gulf Cooperation Council in decision-making and policy-making concerning the global oil markets.

We would like to try to analyze the current challenges that are facing the Gulf Cooperation Council and the efforts made by Member States countries in order to develop a security policy and joint strategy for addressing these bets and challenges as that of the Gulf Cooperation Council come down in its historical context since its inception in 1981, highlighting the stages undergone by the cross its development until it became the most important which is the day of the regional coalitions at the level of the Arab world and the Middle East, especially at the level of the great economic and financial weight.

- The Rich Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is aware that the great challenges within the Arab world itself. Uprisings witnessed by the year 2011 and continued caused severe repercussions 2015 damage too many of the region’s economies, especially with regard to Egypt and Yemen in the tourism sector revenues fell in Tunisia. As for Syria, it remains mired in a civil war and we do not know the end, which goes to the center of regional and international disputes jostling for the Syrian arena. Syria is witnessing some of the repercussions of the turmoil on the back of «Arab Spring» is that the political situation remained stable, but the country remains in great need of economic aid is evidenced by the wave of protests that swept the country on the back of increased fuel prices.

Poverty, and the increase in population are considered the greatest challenges facing most Arab countries, note that the poverty rate according to the United Nations Organization indicators in the range of less than two dollars per day. The per capita income in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is in the range of 23 317 thousand dollars, or about \$ 64 per day? The total crude output reaches of the Gulf Cooperation Council is more than a thousand billion dollars.

Analysts consider that such a large disparity between the rich and the poor in the Arab world is a major threat. If the worsened economic and social crises in countries beyond the «Arab Spring» it may loosen its ramifications on the Gulf region itself.

We have a vision of a modest point that the future of the region in which Syria collapsed and split in Iraq, Yemen, Libya and the fragmentation of the suffering of Egypt, Sudan and the Gulf states of the great challenges of security, economic and political? What Future for playing countries where oil is still defined the main principles and rules of the political game in light of population explosions and an increase in unemployment and a decline in the quality of health and education rates, according to international statistics?

5. THE FUTURE OF THE WAR ON THE “ISLAMIC STATE” (DAASH)

On June 29, 2014 the organization “Daash” declared the “state of the Islamic caliphate,” in a historic speech of its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in the Grand Mosque in Mosul, also announced the naming al-Baghdadi “Caliph of Islam,” it happened after the invasion of “Daash” forces of large areas of the provinces. “Sunni “in the northwest and central Iraq, and its control over many of the headwaters of Iraqi oil, and enable them to impose its hegemony over large areas of Syria and Iraq exceed 200 000 km². The organization of the Islamic State “Daash” political project any “Islamic caliphate” is a highly sophisticated risk to the future of the Arab regimes in the Middle East in particular, because this organization became strong at the expense of “Al Qaeda” in Iraq and Syria, and took a force of attraction for fighters jihadist organizations (Salafi Jihad), not only in Syria and Iraq, but also in parts of the Arab and Muslim, but a wide and universal, and represents a threat to private and Western General American interests, prompting the US administration to form a “coalition forces – regional” to fight “Daash” in Iraq and Syria, but the war on “ Daash “still fall short, because the

international coalition is leading a limited war, limited to air strikes without ground fighting, and because it occurs without the cooperation or coordination with the regional powers Iran, which has ruled out Western and regional pressures to participate, and Turkey, which has distanced itself from participation only after responding to demands in Syria and the province of “Halab “, in particular, where the Turks demanding the imposition of no-fly zone over a wide area from northern Syria, as well as that they do not want to have a fight against “Daash” support for Kurdish separatists Turks who are fighting in the north of Syria to organize “Daash” along with brothers Syria’s Kurds.

The “Islamic State” (Daash) represents a serious threat to the future of the Arab system for many reasons. The first of these reasons that deviates priority project and the status of the question of Palestine as a central Arab issue as it is low priority goal of liberating Palestine and engage in the struggle against the Zionist entity in the project “Islamic State” (Daash). The first priorities “Daash” is the goal of establishing an Islamic caliphate state in all of what it means and what it takes to achieve this goal of the functions most notably, of course, the destruction of the current Arab states as states and communities infidel order based on the ruins of the State of faith in any state succession, and after the priority the fight against the infidels come and finally be confrontation perhaps with the Jews “in the last decade.”

6. CONCLUSION

To alleviate the threats to security in this region of the world, the United States should seek first and foremost to strengthen the internal links between the countries of the region, guarantees the regional security and stability, as well as the ability to cope with security threats to the region, such as the spread of nuclear weapons and International terrorism. As the US States in the face of these risks should reconnect regional security environment so that its strategy realize that it can easily deal with the history and circumstances governed the political and military problems in the region, ie without taking these facts into account. But with the dramatic shifts in the US strategic policy, which lead to a coup in the US position towards Iran and in alliances with the Arab Gulf states at the top of Saudi Arabia. As we note, most American and Western analyzes attributed this to the personal motives and the vision of US President Obama and some circles in the surrounding US decision making, all of which are Obama’s desire to be the man to withdraw from the wars and stop the involvement of the US military force in conflicts and new wars of the impact destroyed the US economy at home, are still wars waged by the neo-conservatives, led by George W. Bush in both Iraq and Afghanistan and the war along the costs, The so-called «terrorism» across the continents of the world, cast their shadows on the US economy which is trying to recover and regain the ability to launch positive growth, and Obama does not want to engage in further military adventures, especially in the Middle East, but this was soon dropped the idea of military intervention in Syria even though it was through limited air attacks from overseas when he found an opportunity or an excuse to retreat through the acceptance of the Russian initiative to settle the Syrian chemical weapons stockpile.

This US position of the Obama administration is indifferent reactions Gulf allies in the Middle East, and what care is moving away from the risk of entering into new military adventures in the Middle East.

Close relation to Obama expressed this by saying that he «does not want for one area – intended (Middle East) – that takes or that ends him up».

On the other hand, there are other motives strategy for the Obama administration, he also appeared in several indicators that he wants to give more attention to Asia-Middle East region and the axis Pacific in the Pacific Ocean, which is transmitted to him since the beginning of the new millennium, the weight of the global economy and America is trying to maintain its leadership in which position in the light of the meteoric rise of the major economic powers there, led by China, Japan, South Korea and India as well as other Asian tigers of Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan and others, as well as the strength of Australia.

Analysts strategists believe that the global economic and strategic conflict will be with the middle of this atheist and the twentieth century in the heart of the Asian axis – the Pacific, and that America wants to give more attention to this emerging region, and will be at the expense of attention to the Middle East, especially in a new and influential variable light is America approaches from acquiring the ability to self-sufficiency in energy after the increase in production size of oil, thanks to the exploitation of the rocky petroleum oils technology, which makes it able to dispense with reliance on oil from the Gulf region as a strategic resource of energy in the global economy, or at least this is what can happen during the next twenty years. As we mentioned, the behavior of countries in the region is one of the security risks. Since the domestic political pressures force the regional countries to refrain from outsourcing to strengthen the security of its

strategy, and then are transformed itself into a threatening external security. In order for the United States adopts a security strategy to ensure the protection of its interests in the region and reduce the risk to international security at the same time, they need to make a strategic assessment of the region to resolve all security and political issues facing the region.

The role that could be played by the security guarantees provided by the United States as part of the framework of regional security in the protection of stability in the Middle East. It seems that these security guarantees are evident today through the US military presence, and joint military exercises and maneuvers and bilateral meetings devoted to the issues of security and the ongoing development of the infrastructure facilities of the States concerned. It is clear that these security assurances can play an important role as part of a regional security framework aimed at reducing the likelihood of War Between the States, or the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other such political pressures and coercive threats that may face the region. If we would like to say to the United States and its regional partners must address the contradictions taking place between the risk to because of tensions between the countries of the region from the point of stability, and those resulting from tensions with the countries of the world on the other. The best strategy to ensure regional security is those that monitor all aspects that would threaten the security environment, and then address the issues by identifying the best ways to control the tension which combines external and internal risks.

Finally, the time has come for the United States to counter the effects of its bureaucracy and its obsession with the implementation of policy through the use of force, and disregard for the countries in the region, which led to the rejection of the peoples of the region to its unfair policies.

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